The exposure report
What a credential, OAuth client, agent or principal was served over a window of up to 90 days, about how many people, and where it went. It is the record a processor owes its controller after an incident (GDPR Art. 33(2): categories and approximate number of data subjects and records; Art. 28(3)(f): assistance with the controller's obligations), built from ledgers Bucker already keeps. It writes no ledger of its own; only the two human acts below leave an audit row.
What it says, and from what
| Section | Source | Attribution |
|---|---|---|
reads: data classes, tiers, personal-data categories, records, reads that went on to a model |
the data.read rows of the read ledger |
the subject |
subjects: how many people, per project, never listed |
the served-pseudonym index (30 days) | the subject |
writes: operations applied by act, and the approval each ran under |
operation.applied rows and approval requests |
the subject |
untrusted: the share of read calls in an hour that carried untrusted-labelled fields |
hourly read counts | the subject (an upper bound) |
context: AI egress and deliveries for the projects the subject reached |
the egress ledger and the delivery ledger | the project, never added to the subject's figures |
controllerNotice: the Art. 33(2) / 28(3)(f) fields, with gaps |
derived from the above | n/a |
Neither the egress ledger nor the delivery ledger has a principal column, so they can say where a
project's data went, not that this credential sent it. They are marked attribution: "project".
A subject is a reference by kind (principal, agent, oauth_client, credential). The ledger
carries no token id, so a credential resolves to the principal or agent that holds it
(subject.granularity says so).
Doors
| Door | Who | What |
|---|---|---|
GET /orgs/:o/exposure-report and MCP exposure_report_get |
security:read on the org |
counts and categories only; an agent may have it |
GET /orgs/:o/exposure-report/export |
a person's own session with pii:read (act exposure_report.export, human-only) |
the subject list of one project; writes a stored-tier data.read row and an audit row; no MCP tool |
POST /orgs/:o/exposure-report/trace |
an OWNER's own session (dashboard) | takes an uploaded list of subject keys; no MCP tool |
An incident-bound token is refused on every door. A subject that is not the organization's answers 404, the same as one that does not exist.
Leak tracing
Pseudonyms at the agent tier are stable, so the same subject key is served again and again.
served_pseudonym_index keeps, for 30 days, an HMAC of <projectId, subjectKey> per response under
a key derived per organization. A leaked list pasted into the trace finds which credentials were
served those values, in which project and when. The subject key is never stored and a digest cannot
be reversed. Another organization's index is never searched. The index records what the dispatcher
tells it to record; a read that never called recordServedPseudonyms is absent, and the report
says how far back the index can see. An erased subject's digests are removed from the index
(eraseServedSubjects), so a trace cannot confirm an erased person was served.
The notice's recipients come from the same project-level ledgers as context and are marked
attribution: "project": they are where the reached projects' data went, not proof that this
credential sent it.
Limits
The report states its own gaps. It does not assess whether a breach occurred, its likely
consequences or the measures the controller should take (notAssessedByBucker); those are the
controller's judgement.