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Trust

Claims with the code attached

Every statement on this page points at a file, a documentation page rendered from that same repository, or an endpoint that answers without an account. Where a control is narrower than it sounds, the narrower version is written here — including the two gaps and one defect we found while checking the claims for this page.

How to read this page

Access and authority

  • claim · 01Shipped

    A token is a ceiling, never a decision

    Authorization is relationship-based. The scopes on a presented token cap what it can possibly do; the answer comes from the principal’s relationship to the object — organization role, team membership, project grant — read from the database on every check. A token carrying every scope in the system is denied everywhere if its holder is a member of nothing. domain/src/modules/authz/check.ts, held by a test literally named scopes are a ceiling, never the decision.
  • claim · 02Shipped

    No machine can merge, at three independent layers

    Approving a fix and merging a pull request are refused to non-human principals. First, the approval endpoint checks the principal kind before it reads anything at all (approvals/requests.ts). Second, fix:approve is filtered out of every agent token at issuance and the merge tier is ungrantable (shared/src/scopes.ts). Third — the one that does not depend on a check being called — there is no merge method in the source-control client (domain/src/modules/scm/provider.ts). Any future action ending in .merge is treated as human-only by default.
  • claim · 03Shipped

    Kill switches run before the relationship lookup

    AI can be disabled organization-wide, and agent pull-request creation separately. Both are read and enforced before any membership query, so switching them off does not depend on the rest of authorization behaving. domain/src/modules/authz/agent-policy.ts.
  • claim · 04Shipped

    Offboarding a person disarms their machines, in one transaction

    Agents are principals with a mandatory human sponsor. Suspending that sponsor — including through SCIM deprovisioning — sets the agent’s lifecycle, revokes its tokens and revokes its delegations inside a single database transaction, so an offboarded employee cannot leave a live machine identity behind. domain/src/modules/agents/identity.ts.
  • claim · 05Shipped

    A narrowed session cannot widen itself

    Delegation follows RFC 8693: nested actor claims, audience-bound tokens, a fifteen-minute default life capped at one hour, and the presented token as its own ceiling — the minted delegation is the intersection of what the human holds, what the agent may hold, and what was asked for. Incident-scoped tokens narrow that further to one incident and its objects, Ed25519-signed and re-verified by their own handler rather than trusting an already-attached principal. domain/src/modules/agents/delegation.ts, api/src/modules/agents/blast-radius.ts.
  • claim · 06Shipped

    The sandbox is disposed on every path

    A remediation run provisions a sandbox with default-deny egress, no production secrets and a hard timeout, and disposes it in a finally — including on throws, timeouts and metering failures, which are explicitly caught so that they cannot prevent disposal. A leaked sandbox is a bill and, on a hosted provider, a live shell. workers/src/remediation/execute-remediation-run.ts.

Data handling

  • claim · 01Shipped

    The database refuses to connect in the clear

    A DATABASE_URL naming a host reachable off the machine, with no TLS material configured, throws instead of connecting. Certificates are held as PEM text from encrypted secrets and handed to the driver as strings — there is no code path that reads a certificate from a file. db/src/db-tls.ts, with an allow/refuse table in db-tls.test.ts.

    What is not true yet: The code enforces “encrypted, and never on disk”. Whether the connection is genuinely mutual is enforced by the database endpoint, which demands a client certificate — the code would also accept server-authenticated TLS as protected. Loopback, private-range and Compose-service hostnames are exempt from the refusal, and there is a named escape hatch for transports secured elsewhere.

  • claim · 02Shipped

    There is no plaintext .env, and the guard is arithmetic

    Secrets are sops + age ciphertext in the repository and are decrypted straight into a process; no command writes a decrypted value to disk. A pre-commit hook blocks secret-shaped paths, private-key material, and exact live secret values, matched by SHA-256 against a local fingerprint index. It never decrypts, so it can run where no key exists. scripts/secrets.sh, .githooks/pre-commit, and a sixteen-case battery in scripts/test-secret-guard.sh.
  • claim · 03Shipped

    Personal data is removed before storage, and again before a model

    The scrubber runs before anything is persisted, on all three ingest paths: the worker pipeline, the agentless landing lane, and OTLP. No configuration flag disables it — session replay and agent-observability capture modes decide whether text is kept at all, and even their most permissive setting still scrubs. A second, stricter pass runs before an issue reaches a model, in the essence projection, in root-cause evidence assembly, and in fix authoring. domain/src/lib/scrub/, modules/essence/service.ts, modules/rca/evidence.ts, workers/src/remediation/prepare-remediation-run.ts; see also session replay and privacy.

    What is not true yet: The fix-authoring prompt used to be the exception, and we found it while writing this page. It was built from the denormalized issue row — title, exception value, culprit — which carries only the storage-tier scrub, so an email address or IP embedded in an exception message could reach the model that drafts the patch. It now takes the same agent-tier pass as the essence and RCA paths, pinned by a test that fails if the tier is weakened. We are leaving the history here rather than quietly presenting the fixed state: writing this page is what found the defect, which is the argument for the page.

  • claim · 04Shipped

    By default nothing is sent to a model, and one switch turns the rest off

    The default language-model provider is deterministic and rule-based: it runs inside the process, makes no network call and needs no key, so root-cause analysis works with nothing leaving. Only a deployment whose operator configured a hosted provider sends anything. Root-cause analysis then sends three short validated sentences (file, function, release and commit names, never the exception message); fix authoring sends the issue, the scrubbed essence and source code from your connected repository, unredacted by design, because the patch applier needs the model to reproduce the bytes. The per-organization aiEnabled setting refuses every one of them, and is audited. domain/src/modules/rca/llm.ts, rca/service.ts, workers/src/remediation/author-llm.ts; the field-by-field statement is AI data use.

    What is not true yet: We do not train or fine-tune any model on your content and have no model of our own. An organization can store its own Anthropic or OpenAI key, and then its model calls run on that key. We do not have a zero-data-retention agreement with a provider, and we say so rather than imply one.

  • claim · 05Shipped

    Access, portability and erasure, derived from the live schema

    Data-subject requests are implemented and organization-scoped behind an admin check. The subject surface is walked from the live foreign-key graph rather than a hand-maintained list of tables, so a table added tomorrow is covered tomorrow — and the test asserts completeness against that same graph. domain/src/modules/compliance/dsr.ts.

    What is not true yet: Erasure is a stated policy rather than a blanket delete: nullable references are nulled, non-nullable leaf rows are deleted, non-leaf rows keep a pointer at a pseudonymized tombstone, and the user row itself is pseudonymized. Audit logs are retained under GDPR Art. 17(3)(b)/(e), reduced to a principal id and a SHA-256 digest — never raw payload.

  • claim · 06Partly shipped

    Retention windows, and what actually deletes

    Event data is archived to cold storage and the day-partition is then DROP TABLEd — not soft-deleted — with cold objects expired past their window. It runs hourly by default and drops by default. domain/src/modules/retention/pass.ts, workers/src/retention/scheduler.ts.

    What is not true yet: The second retention system — audit logs, spans, log records, replay segments — hard-deletes too, and the worker enforces its windows hourly by default, workers/src/compliance/scheduler.ts. Two things can stop it: a deployment can switch it off with COMPLIANCE_RETENTION_ENABLED=false, and a runtime probe refuses a pass on a build where blob objects are not deleted before the rows that name them. Either way the windows go unenforced until someone acts, so read this as a scheduled sweep a deployment can disable, not an unconditional guarantee.

  • claim · 07Partly shipped

    Audit events into your own SIEM

    Audit rows stream out as HMAC-signed NDJSON batches over a guarded HTTP client, with a durable per-sink cursor that advances only on successful delivery, so a failed batch is retried rather than skipped. domain/src/modules/compliance/audit-export.ts.

    What is not true yet: There is one sink kind — a generic webhook. No Splunk, Datadog or Elastic driver exists, so your collector has to accept signed JSON Lines over POST. Delivery is flushed by the worker every minute (and on demand), so your collector trails the audit log by about a minute rather than receiving each row as it is written.

  • claim · 08Partly shipped

    Region residency

    Regions are a real constraint rather than a label on a DSN: a hard refusal fires when an organization’s region does not match the region the process is running in, and a cross-region migration path (export, import, cutover, abort) exists with digested bundles. domain/src/modules/compliance/residency.ts, compliance/region-migration.ts.

    What is not true yet: We operate one region. The EU control plane is marked inactive in the registry and does not exist, so nobody is running in it. The residency assertion is also applied per module — at the DSR and migration surfaces — rather than as a global request hook; residency for ordinary reads rests on a regional process holding a connection to only its own database.

Evidence and the audit trail

  • claim · 01Shipped

    Every audit row goes through one function

    modules/authz/audit.ts is the only caller of the audit-log create in the entire API; roughly 185 call sites across the modules reach it, directly or through four thin wrappers. The chokepoint is the control worth citing, not the count — audit coverage is reviewable by reading one function’s callers, and no module can invent an unlogged write path. The Human Accountability Ledger reads that trail back per person, weighting declines equally with approvals and classifying each decline by why.
  • claim · 02Shipped

    Redaction that does not break the proofs

    Redacting a ledger entry nulls the readable envelope and stamps a reason, and leaves the leaf hash, every published root and every previously issued inclusion proof verifying unchanged — asserted by a test that publishes a checkpoint, redacts, and re-verifies. Entries containing personal data are refused at issuance rather than quietly edited later. domain/src/modules/proof-ledger/issue.ts, proof-ledger/personal-data.ts.
  • claim · 03Shipped

    Verification you can run without us

    A Proof Ledger bundle verifies offline: RFC 6962 inclusion and consistency proofs, Ed25519 over DSSE, and every claim re-derivable from the document. There are three implementations — the issuer’s, a dependency-free CLI, and a browser build — and they are pinned to each other by differential tests over a corpus of over-claiming mutations, so the format is not one only its author can read. tooling/bucker-verify/, shared/src/proof-ledger/, tooling/bucker-verify/test/conformance-differential.test.ts.
  • claim · 04Partly shipped

    Independent witnesses

    Checkpoint co-signature is implemented end to end: a witness registry, two transports, delivery with retries and receipts, and real Ed25519 countersignature verification against the witness’s own registered key. domain/src/modules/proof-ledger/witness.ts; the kit is documented in witness onboarding.

    What is not true yet: It is opt-in and defaults to none. Nothing requires a minimum number of witnesses, and a witness under Bucker’s own custody is reported as not independent — the API publishes an explicit flag for that rather than letting anyone infer independence from the presence of rows. Until a third party holds a checkpoint, the log proves internal consistency, not history.

What a signature actually proves

Two different things in this system are called “signed” and only one of them means anything to you. Collapsing them would be the largest cryptographic overclaim available to this page, so they are kept apart everywhere, including in the product: the in-browser verifier refuses a pasted provenance certificate by name, explaining that a shared-secret MAC can be forged by anyone who can check it.

Which artifacts a third party can verify
ArtifactSignatureCan a third party check it?
Proof Ledger bundleEd25519 over DSSEYes
Transparency-log checkpointEd25519 over the note bytesYes
Witness countersignatureEd25519, against a registered keyYes, when configured
Transparency register snapshotEd25519Yes
Per-fix provenance certificateEd25519, same key as the ledgerYes — certificates issued before 0.14.0 are HMAC-SHA256 and are not
Accountability ledger exportHMAC-SHA256No — same shared secret

One further disclosure, because it changes what the top four rows are worth: the Ed25519 signing key has three possible provenances and the key endpoint states which is in use — a dedicated key, a fallback that reuses the access-token key, or an ephemeral per-process key when none is configured. An ephemeral key does not survive a restart and is not a durable attestation. Ask which one a deployment is running before relying on a signature from it.

What answers without an account

These routes require no session and no API key. They are the ones that let an outsider check us rather than take our word.

  • GET /transparency/register

    Deployment-wide miss rates — rejected patches, in-window regressions, prompt-injection trial results. No organization, project, issue or principal identifier appears in it. There is no edit, delete or retract route for a published snapshot, and a test enforces that.

  • GET /transparency/snapshots/:leafIndex/inclusion-proof

    Re-derive a published snapshot’s Merkle inclusion yourself. The product’s own register page recomputes the root in the reader’s browser and ignores the API’s verified flag.

  • GET /transparency/consistency-proof?oldSize=N

    Prove the log was appended to and not rewritten between two sizes.

  • GET /.well-known/proof-ledger-keys

    The Ed25519 public key, with its provenance disclosed.

  • GET /billing/plans

    The plan ladder the product enforces. This site’s pricing page reads it, so a published price cannot drift from the one that bills you.

Sub-processors

Who can reach customer data on this deployment. The list is read from one file in the repository, the same file the draft data processing agreement takes its annex from, so this table and that contract cannot disagree. No agreement is signed with any of them. The entity that would sign is Atilan LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company, which owns and operates Bucker; it has signed nothing yet.

Sub-processors
Sub-processorPurposeDataLocationStatusContract
Fly.io, Inc.Compute for the API, the workers and the MCP serverCustomer content and personal data in flight and in memory; application logsUnited States (Dallas, region dfw)In useNo agreement signed
DigitalOcean, LLCManaged PostgreSQL (the production and development databases)All stored customer content and account dataRegion not yet confirmedIn useNo agreement signed
Tigris Data, Inc. (S3-compatible object storage, provisioned through Fly.io)Object storage for event envelopes, replay recordings and cold archives, in the bucket bucker-ioEnvelopes, replay segments and archived eventsGlobal bucket (not pinned to one country)In useNo agreement signed
Vercel Inc.Hosting for the dashboard, the marketing site and the public status siteDashboard traffic in flight; customer status-page content; no databaseGlobal edge networkIn useNo agreement signed
Cloudflare, Inc.DNS for bucker.io (DNS-only records; no traffic is proxied)None. DNS queries for Bucker hostnames onlyGlobalIn useNo agreement signed
Anthropic, PBC (default model provider)Fix authoring, and root-cause analysis started automatically by an alert rule or the automatic fix sweep, on Bucker's key; on an organization's own stored key, also root-cause analysis requested from the dashboard or the API and the issue summary. Only when the organization's AI features are enabled and a hosted provider is configured. On Bucker's key, root-cause analysis requested from the dashboard or the API and the issue summary stay on the deterministic, rule-based providerScrubbed issue content; repository source in fix-authoring prompts (not scrubbed, by design)United StatesOnly when AI features are enabledNo agreement signed
OpenAI, L.L.C. (default embeddings provider; this row names whichever OpenAI-compatible vendor is configured)Similar-issue and grouping suggestions: one embedding vector per issue, only when the organization's AI features are enabled and a hosted embeddings provider is configuredEach issue's exception type, exception message, title and culprit, after the storage-tier scrub. No repository source and no event payloadsUnited StatesBuilt, not connected on this deploymentNo agreement signed
Stripe, Inc.Card payment and billing portal for paid plansBilling contact and organization identifier. Card details are entered on pages Stripe hosts and never reach BuckerUnited StatesBuilt, not connected on this deploymentNo agreement signed
Modal Labs, Inc. (sandbox provider)Isolated execution of proposed fixesRepository source and test output for a proposed fixUnited StatesBuilt, not connected on this deploymentNo agreement signed

As of 2026-10-28, version 0.2-draft. DRAFT — REQUIRES COUNSEL. No agreement is signed with any entity below. The entity that would sign is Atilan LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company, Sheridan, Wyoming, which owns and operates Bucker; it has signed nothing and counsel has not reviewed this list.

Where data sits, and what it is used for

Every store, the provider that holds it and where, then what a model provider receives, the data-use settings and the statement that Bucker does not train on your content. All of it is read from the same file as the table above, which is also served as JSON at bucker.io/trust.json with no token, and a test compares the regions and the object store with the deployment’s own manifests.

Bucker region us

The only region in operation. The EU region is marked inactive in the residency registry and does not exist, so no EU residency is offered and no DNS name for it is published.

Stores in Bucker region us
StoreProviderWherePlacementNotes
Computethe API, the workers and the MCP server, and therefore data in flight and in memoryFly.io, Inc.United States (Dallas, region dfw)one region
Databaseall stored customer content and account dataDigitalOcean, LLCRegion not yet confirmedone regionThe region of the managed PostgreSQL cluster is not documented in the repository and has not been confirmed with the account holder, so no region is stated.
Object storageevent envelopes, replay recordings and cold archivesTigris Data, Inc. (S3-compatible object storage, provisioned through Fly.io)Global bucket (not pinned to one country)global`auto` is the placeholder an S3 client sends to Tigris, not a place. A global bucket is placed by the provider and is not pinned to one country.
Web hostingthe dashboard, the marketing site and the public status site; no databaseVercel Inc.Global edge networkedge network
DNSDNS records for bucker.io; no traffic passes through itCloudflare, Inc.Globaledge network
Model providers
Model providerReceivesWhose keyEnabled byRetention
Anthropic, PBCscrubbed issue content, repository sourceBucker's or the organization's ownA hosted provider configured on the deployment and AI features enabled for the organization. Neither is a default: the default provider is deterministic and sends nothing to any model.The provider's own API retention applies, and no agreement with Bucker states a window. Bucker keeps the result of an analysis and the resulting proposal, and does not keep a transcript of what was sent. No zero-data-retention agreement is signed.
An OpenAI-compatible embeddings provider (OpenAI, L.L.C. by default)four issue text fieldsBucker'sA hosted embeddings provider configured on the deployment and AI features enabled for the organization. None is connected on this deployment.The provider's own API retention applies, and no agreement with Bucker states a window. Bucker keeps the resulting vector, not the text it was made from. No zero-data-retention agreement is signed.
Data-use settings
Use of customer contentStateControl
Train, fine-tune or evaluate a model on customer contentOffThere is no setting: Bucker has no model of its own and no training pipeline, so nothing can turn this on.
Send scrubbed content to a hosted model provider for root-cause analysis, fix authoring and issue summariesOffOff unless the deployment operator configures a hosted provider and a key. Once one is configured, an organization owner can turn AI features off for the organization at any time, and the change is recorded in the audit log.
Send four issue fields to a hosted embeddings provider for similar-issue suggestionsOffOff unless the deployment operator configures a hosted embeddings provider and a key; then per organization with AI features enabled.
Store end-user product eventsOffBucker stores no end-user product event today. Before it does, a per-project gate stays shut until an organization owner has accepted an amended data processing addendum and a person has recorded the project's lawful basis.
Share analysis or fix memory between customersOffNot built. Any analysis or fix memory is scoped to the organization that produced the content.
Deployment operator access to issues or full content of an organizationOffOperators see metadata only. An organization owner or admin can raise it, with an expiry that is evaluated on read; break-glass needs a reason, is capped at four hours and raises a banner in the organization it was taken against.

Certifications held: none. Advisories published: none. A draft vulnerability disclosure policy and a security.txt are published; counsel has not reviewed the safe-harbour wording. There is no bug bounty.

Notice of a new sub-processor: A new sub-processor is listed here as not_connected, with the date it will begin to receive data and the date notice was given, at least 14 days before it receives anything. Every new version of this file also records one TRUST_MANIFEST change event on every project, kept for the change-stream read that will let a customer's agent see a notice during the notice period; that read is not built yet, so today the notice is this file, its change log and the trust page. The product cannot email the notice either, because no outbound mail is configured on this deployment. The DPA draft (clause 5.2) proposes 30 days' notice. Counsel decides which period Bucker commits to; a test enforces the shorter one.

Weighed, not held

  • SOC 2 Type II. An engineering self-assessment against the Trust Services Criteria is published at /trust/soc2-readiness. No auditor is engaged and no audit is in progress.
  • ISO/IEC 27001. Weighed beside SOC 2 as an expected certification. No work has started and none is claimed.
  • ISO/IEC 42001 (AI management systems). Weighed for the agent features. No work has started and none is claimed.
  • EU AI Act, Article 50 transparency for text an agent writes in a customer's workspace. No determination has been made about whether it applies. Machine-readable labelling of agent-written text is planned and not built.
  • HIPAA. Decided against for now: no business associate agreement is offered and the product has no health-data mode.
  • PCI DSS. Card details are entered on pages Stripe hosts and never reach Bucker, and no payment provider is connected on this deployment. No PCI attestation is held or claimed.

Changes to this manifest

  • 0.2-draft, 2026-10-28. Object storage corrected. The list named Amazon Web Services S3 in us-east-1; the deployment's object store is the Tigris bucket bucker-io (S3_REGION is auto), so the AWS row is replaced by a Tigris row. No data moved: this corrects what the list said, not where data sits.
  • 0.2-draft, 2026-10-28. The DigitalOcean row no longer says only 'United States': the cluster's region is not documented, so it is shown as not yet confirmed instead of assumed. The compute region (Dallas, dfw) is unchanged and is now checked against the Fly manifests on every test run.
  • 0.2-draft, 2026-10-28. The sub-processor list becomes the trust manifest, published at bucker.io/trust.json: it adds the regions and stores, the model providers, the data-use settings (all off), the no-training statement, certifications held (none), questions weighed, the disclosure policy, advisories and this change log, and it commits to at least 14 days' notice before a new sub-processor receives data.
  • 0.1-draft, 2026-10-17. First dated sub-processor list: nine rows, none with a signed agreement.

What Bucker does not do

Four statements, published so that nobody has to infer the boundary from silence: network, device and kernel data with its coverage map, and what Bucker will not do to your databases, queues and caches, what Bucker will not do about your security, and what Bucker will never do with your cloud spend. All four are drafts awaiting the owner’s ratification.

Answering your questionnaire

The questions a security review actually asks, with the answers, including the ones where the answer is no.

Do you hold a SOC 2 report?
No. No audit is in progress, no auditor is engaged, and no observation window has begun. The readiness note maps what exists in code to the Trust Services Criteria, and lists the policy work that does not exist.
Is data encrypted in transit?
Yes to the database, and enforced rather than configured: a remote host with no TLS material throws instead of connecting in the clear (db/src/db-tls.ts). Outbound calls go through a guarded client that refuses private and loopback destinations (domain/src/lib/egress.ts).
Is data encrypted at rest?
Our own secrets are, with sops + age, and you can verify that from the repository. Storage-layer encryption of the database and object store is a property of the managed services we run on; we have not documented it and we do not assert it here.
Can your AI merge code into our repository?
No, and not because a permission is switched off: there is no merge method in the source-control client to call. See “No machine can merge” above for the two checks that sit in front of that structural fact.
Who can approve a change, and can you prove who did?
Only a human principal. Every decision is written through a single audit function and is readable per person in the accountability ledger, with the full chain of authority — actor, delegation, budget, trust rung, approval, certificate — resolvable for any one action.
Do you send our data to a model provider?
Not by default: the default provider is rule-based and sends nothing. If a hosted provider is configured, root-cause analysis, the issue summary and fix authoring call it. Content is scrubbed before it is stored and again, at a stricter tier, before the essence, RCA and fix-authoring paths reach a model (fix authoring skipped that tier until writing this page found it; see above), except that the repository source in a fix-authoring prompt is not redacted, by design. We do not train on your content. We have no zero-data-retention agreement to show you and do not claim one. Per organization, aiEnabled turns all of it off; the details are in AI data use.
Can we get audit logs into our SIEM?
Yes, as HMAC-signed JSON Lines over a webhook, with at-least-once delivery, flushed by the worker every minute (and on demand). There is no vendor-specific driver.
How do we exercise a data-subject request?
Through the compliance endpoints: access and portability export, and erasure. Erasure pseudonymizes rather than deletes the subject row and retains audit logs under GDPR Art. 17(3)(b)/(e), reduced to an id and a digest.
Where is our data stored?
Compute: United States (Dallas, region dfw). Database: Region not yet confirmed. Object storage: Global bucket (not pinned to one country). Multi-region residency is implemented with a hard refusal and a migration path, but the EU control plane is inactive and unbuilt. The table of stores above is the whole statement, and it is read from the same file as bucker.io/trust.json.
Do you have an incident response plan, security training, or background checks?
A draft incident-response plan and a draft policy set are written, with a proposed customer notification timeline, but nobody has adopted them, no roles have names and no tabletop has been run, so we do not call them a control. There is no security training and no background check process. The readiness note lists all of it as policy-without-tooling rather than implying it from anything on this page.
Do you have a vulnerability disclosure policy?
A draft one: /security and /.well-known/security.txt. There is no bug bounty, and counsel has not reviewed the safe-harbour wording.
Are your backups tested?
No. A scripted encrypted dump and a restore drill that verifies every row count exist and have been run against a local database, including the real schema. No production backup has been taken and no production drill has been run, so there is no tested recovery of the production database today.
Do you have a third-party penetration test report?
No. One has not been commissioned.
Do you publish a status page or an SLA?
status.bucker.io publishes live reachability checks against our public endpoints, made from outside the infrastructure they report on, with the time of each check. It is not a hosted status page: no incident history, no subscriber notifications, no maintenance calendar. We offer no SLA and no SLO.
Is your source available for review?
Not publicly. Bucker is a hosted service and its server source is proprietary. Every path named on this page is a path in the repository a reviewer under agreement receives.

The two documents behind this page

What we do not claim