# Cost governance: what Bucker will never do with your cloud spend

**Draft, awaiting the owner's ratification of version 1.0.** It is published ahead of the cost work
so the boundary is on record first. It is version 1.0, as of 2026-11-04.

Bucker reads cost data, attributes it, and can hold a budget or a cap. It does not spend your money
and it does not change your cloud. This page lists what that means in practice, who decides what
Bucker does own, and the *never list*: the acts no tool, action or provider integration is allowed
to name.

## Who decides what

Cost has three scopes, narrower than anything that existed before it:

| Scope | Lets you | Held by |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `cost:read` | See cost data, budgets and attribution. | Owners, admins and the billing role |
| `cost:write` | Create and change budgets, allocation rules, units and cost sources. | Owners, admins and the billing role |
| `cost:cap` | Set a provider cap that pauses spend. | Owners, admins and the billing role |

**The billing role decides what it owns.** A request to change a cost budget, a provider cap or a
usage alert can be approved by someone holding `fix:approve` **or** `billing:write`, and the
approver must also hold the relation that act costs on your organization (`configure_cost`,
`cap_cost` or `configure_usage`; the billing role holds the first two). A billing member can
therefore approve a budget change and cannot approve a code fix; a member who can approve fixes
cannot approve a budget change unless they hold the cost relation too. Everything else about how requests are
decided is in [Agent governance](agent-governance.md).

Some cost acts are human-only, whatever the policy: raising or removing a cap, detaching a budget's
authority effects, deleting a budget, an allocation rule, a unit or a source, and entering a
credential. An agent can narrow a cap, never lift one, and no agent lifts its own.

## The never list

No registry action, no tool (planned or live) and no provider descriptor may be named for any of
these. The list is enforced by a test that walks all three and fails on a name that says so.

| Never | Includes |
| --- | --- |
| Purchases | Buying credits, commitments, reservations, savings plans or marketplace items |
| Resource deletion | Terminating, destroying or decommissioning instances, volumes, buckets, clusters or snapshots |
| Plan and add-on changes | Upgrading, downgrading or changing a cloud plan, subscription or add-on |
| Billing disablement | Switching off, closing or cancelling billing on an account |
| Key minting | Creating or rotating a cloud access key or API key on your behalf |

Related lines that follow from it: Bucker holds no standing write role in your cloud beyond one
cap-only credential; a credential that can purchase or mint keys is refused at entry; there is no
chat assistant that acts on spend, no "autonomous" mode, no in-network inference proxy, and no fee
taken as a share of your savings.

## Where this is enforced

The approver rule is read from the action registry for each request and checked when someone decides
it, on the organization the request belongs to, so `billing:write` earned as a billing member of
another organization satisfies nothing here. The never list is a registry-wide test that passes on
the current registry and fails on a synthetic row for a purchase or a tool named `buy_credits`. See
[Security scope](security-scope.md) for the equivalent boundary around security work.
